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1. Introduction 
 
The so-called ´pro-active view´ of the role of the lawyer is that he or she 
should ideally anticipate rather than resolve conflict. Applied to the 
contracting lawyer, the view is that lawyers should avoid conflict by making 
sure that the contracting parties stipulate in the contract such rights and 
obligations that may otherwise become the subject of dispute. The present 
article argues that this ´pro-activity view´, while inherently sound, can be 
carried too far. Pro-activeness is subject to diminishing returns in the sense 
that some contingencies should not be addressed in contract simply because 
the costs of so doing is greater than the benefits. This article attempts to 
delineate these costs and benefits and to thereby account for the factors that 
enter into the determination of what may be termed the optimal degree of pro-
activity in contracting.  
One of the main points will be to argue that while drafting costs are certain to 
be incurred, the benefits are often uncertain and may be small because there 
are alternatives to settling conflicts through contracts ex ante.  
When accounting for the costs and benefits, a distinction is worth drawing 
between the direct and the indirect benefits. The direct benefit is uncertain 
when the contingency is uncertain to occur, and it may be small simply 
because the contingency may not in itself involve large sums of money. And 
even if the probability of the contingency occurring and the stakes of it 
occurring are high, it may not be worthwhile drafting a specific clause 
covering the contingency, because it may be almost as well to leave the issue 
to be negotiated if the contingency should occur. A generally worded contract 
leaves specific contingencies to be renegotiated as they arise, and the parties 
may rationally choose to rely on the fairness of such renegotiation. Such 
reliance is particularly likely to be rational when one or both of the parties 
protect their reputation and when there is a wish to preserve a good 
contractual relationship in order to further future cooperation. Furthermore, if 
the parties will disagree about how to fill in a general contract in a given 
contingency, they may bring the issue before an arbitrator or a judge, and let 
him or her interpret the contract. Hence, opportunistic renegotiation may be 
restrained by the possibility of court interpretation1.  For all of these reasons 
the benefit to writing specific clauses may seem small. However, the issue is 
more complex, since there are also indirect benefits of specifying clauses. 
This becomes apparent when one considers the essential functions served by 
contract. Contracts serve several purposes: they allocate risk and secure 
incentives of various kinds one of which is for the parties to undertake 
contract-specific investments (so-called reliance investments), and the extent 
to which these purposes are served by a particular contract will depend on its 
completeness. This provides, it will be argued, an indirect benefit of drafting 
specific clauses, which needs to be taken into account when deciding on the 
length and specificity of the contract.   
The article will present this more complex trade-off between elaborate, 
specific clauses on one hand and simple, general contracts on the other. It 
will further argue that it cannot be taken for granted that contracts will become 
more elaborate over time; in areas of economic life where uncertainty is 
pervasive, one may instead see rather simple contracts supported or 
enforced through mechanisms that rely not so much on court enforcement as 
on reputation.  
An example will be used throughout the article to illustrate the main concepts 
and ideas. The example may not be realistic in all respects; the purpose of it 
is to illustrate the general problem of how (much) to commit through 
contracting, not to analyze a specific contracting situation. The example will 
be introduced below, after which first the direct costs and benefits and then 
the indirect benefits of elaborate contracting will be analyzed. In the spirit of 
the theme of the conference on pro-active contracting in the information age, 
the article ends with some reflections on the implications of computers and 
the Internet for `the optimal degree of proactiveness´.  
 
2. The Example 
 
To illustrate costs and benefits of writing specific versus general (or no)  
contractual terms, consider the example of e-bay offering itself as a trading 
mechanism to firms or individuals2. Consider, furthermore, a firm that if it 
chooses to trade through e-bay must spend time learning about the particular 
rules and mechanisms of e-bay. Suppose that e-bay may at one point raise 
prices substantially, taking advantage of the fact that its customers have 
spent time learning about e-bay and cannot easily coordinate on shifting to 
some other trading forum (the so-called network effect). If the firm has not yet 
                                                          
1 as well as by application of legal default rules. 
2 As alluded to above, this example will not be based on a thorough study of the contractual practices of e-bay. Rather, 
it is meant to illustrate the trade-offs more generally, and so some of the trade-offs mentioned may not accurately reflect 
the real situation for e-bay.   
decided to trade through e-bay, it will be interested in a commitment from e-
bay not to raise prices in the future. The question for e-bay is how specifically 
it should commit, if at all. Consider for concreteness three possibilities.  
  
1. e-bay freely sets the price of its services over time, constrained only by 
its reputation 
2. e-bay promises not to raise prices in a way that is not justified by 
increased costs 
3. e-bay’s prices follows some price index 
 
 
These contracts differ in terms of their specificity and in terms of drafting 
costs. Which contract is optimal depends on the direct and the indirect 
benefits and costs of specific clauses, that will now be analysed in turn.  
 
3. The direct benefits of specific clauses 
  
In deciding between the three contracts, the following factors play a role, 
apart from the cost of defining the price index and writing it into the 
contract3:  
 
1. the probability that it will become advantageous for e-bay to increase 
the price (substantially) 
2. the way in which the legal system will interpret the contract which 
forbids price increases that are not justified by cost considerations 
3. the extent to which parties can negotiate about the interpretation of a 
generally worded clause (as that of the second contract) and in this way 
fill in the contract as time passes 
4. the extent to which e-bay will be kept from increasing price by concern 
for its reputation 
 
In abstract terms, whether parties to a contract should write a contingency 
into a contract depends on the probability that it will ill occur and whether it 
will be cheaper for them to renegotiate the contract if the if the contingency 
should occur. That (re-) negotiation is likely to be influenced by the way in 
which a court will interpret the general contract in the contingency, and by the 
parties’ concern for their reputation.  
 
                                                          
3 For a more extensive and formal analysis, see Steve Shavell: `On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts’ , 
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 445. See also R. Posner: The Law and Economics of Contract 
Interpretation, U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 229. 
Ad 1. If the probability of a price hike is small, it may not be worthwhile 
incurring the certain cost of writing a cost-plus contract (the second 
contract). Quite simply, many contingencies are not worth addressing 
specifically because they occur with a low probability.  
Ad 2. If e-bay stipulates that it will not raise prices unless its costs increase, 
the question becomes how a court will interpret such a clause. Clearly, if e-
bay significantly raises its price and cannot document any change of costs, 
the price increase may be found to be a breach of contract. But what if the 
cost increase is due to a higher quality of service? Clearly, an elaborate or 
complete contract would allow e-bay to raise prices somewhat in response 
to a higher level of quality that may e.g. follow from a technical innovation. If 
the court can be trusted to interpret the contract in such a way that the 
interpreted contract becomes akin to that which the parties would ideally 
wish to write if it were costless to write elaborate contracts, the parties can -
in theory at least - fall back on court interpretation and thereby save the 
costs of writing elaborate contracts. However, the court cannot realistically 
be assumed to always come near to what the parties intended, they lack 
information concerning the parties’ true desires and may find it hard to know 
whether a given innovation justifies a cost increase of a given magnitude, 
even with expert assistance. Furthermore, the court may not always 
understand its role as that of coming as close as possible to what the parties 
would have written into a complete contract, i.e. as coming as close as 
possible to what the parties `truly intended´. Note that if courts do have this 
understanding it may be easier and less costly for parties to contract, for 
they can trust courts to fill out incomplete contracts in ways that come close 
to what they would have written into a more complete contract4. If courts can 
be relied on to fill in incomplete contracts and to interpret them in a 
reasonable way, this may at the same time deter e-bay from initiating an 
unreasonable price increase and allow e-bay some necessary flexibility. In 
this case there will hence be less reason for the parties to incur the cost of 
linking prices to a price-index or to constrain e-bay through other specific 
clauses. But naturally court interpretation of a contract is costly5, and so this 
way of saving drafting costs works better if the parties can anticipate how 
the court will interpret a general clause. If so, the parties can settle the issue 
                                                          
4 If this principle is accepted, it follows that damages should, as a general rule, be considered the better remedy 
compared with specific performance. Specific performance is the rule that contracts should be enforced as written, 
while damages allow parties to escape from obligations by paying compensation to the other party under some 
contingencies. Often, the latter is what the parties would have agreed to in a more complete contract if the cost of 
writing such a contract were less significant.  
5 And therefore courts may interpret contracts literally to force the parties to spend resources on writing contracts.  
through negotiation, knowing how the court will settle the issue in the event 
they cannot agree6.       
In this context, it may also be noted that default rules serve the same 
function as contract interpretation. Default rules should ideally come close to 
what the parties would have included in an elaborate contract. The example 
of damage measures illustrates the important role default rules may play in 
this regard: Consider a seller and the buyer of some good to be produced in 
the future, who wish to condition production and sale on future production 
costs for the seller and future needs of the buyer. However, stipulating such 
future contingencies may be costly, and so the parties may wish to fall back 
on being able to breach the contract if costs become too high or needs turn 
out to diminish. The default rule is (in reality, for production contracts) 
expectation damages, and the point is that this default rule leads (under 
idealized assumptions) to the same outcome as would result from a 
completely specified contract (this is the so-called ´efficient breach of 
contract´ result). Hence, well-designed default rules can substitute for 
elaborate contracts as can contract interpretation by a tribunal (arbitrator or 
judge).   
 
Ad 3. As just mentioned, the parties may reach agreement or compromise  
about the meaning of a general clause7. They will do so in the light of how a 
court is likely to interpret the clause, but may also be concerned about what 
is fair and reasonable. If the agreement is likely to come close to what the 
parties would have agreed upon ex ante, there is little reason for them to 
write a specific clause since doing so incurs a certain cost while the cost of 
(re-) negotiation will only be incurred if the contingency arises.  
 
Ad 4.  In reality, e-bay is pre-occupied with its reputation. For example, it 
enters into a public dialogue with some of its core users concerning its 
mechanisms and policies. When such a dialogue is made public on the 
internet, it may constrain e-bay in its pricing policies more effectively than 
commitment through specific contractual clauses. Note that a specific clause 
cannot specify how e-bay should price new services; which services will be 
invented is essentially not knowable ex ante, and hence cannot be the 
object of contracting. The pricing of such new services is hence better 
constrained by reputation than by explicit contracting.  
 
                                                          
6 Note, however, that for court interpretation to have a significant effect on the outcome of re-negotiation, it must be 
credible that one of the parties will bring the issue before the court.  
7 As will be further mentioned below, e-bay has in fact established a group of users whose views of e-bay policy are 
communicated to a wider audience and hence carries weight. Conceivably, e-bay could negotiate with a representative 
of this group. 
To this account of direct costs and benefits of specific clauses must be added 
the cost of not coming close to the complete contract, of not establishing the 
kind or level of commitment desirable. To analyse this indirect cost, the 
fundamental rationales of contracting must be addressed.  
 
5. The indirect benefits of specific clauses 
 
At the most general level one can inquire why people enter into contracts at 
all. Prevailing theory stresses four motives each of which will first be 
described generally and then related to the example of e-bay.  
Contracts: 
 
 
1. avoid future disputes by anticipating issues and by aligning the 
parties’ expectations 
2. allocate risk between the parties in a way that corresponds to the 
parties’ risk preferences and in a way that establish incentives for the 
parties to act cooperatively 
3. allow the parties to commit to future acts, rendering it optimal for one 
or both parties to invest in their cooperative project 
4. enable the parties to plan future activities 
 
As for the first purpose, when people cooperate on some venture, they often 
hold some implicit and possibly conflicting views of what the cooperation 
entails. It is important that such differences are addressed, otherwise they 
may later lead to conflict when disagreement arises. This rationale of contract 
is sometimes stressed by practitioners as the more important, but it may be 
noted that it is not so much a rationale for creating binding commitments 
(which is what contracts do in a legal sense), as it is a rationale for the parties 
to communicate their expectations to each other before embarking on a joint 
effort.   
For e-bay it may be worth stipulating the circumstances in which it will raise 
prices in the future. Raising prices without prior announcement may surprise 
customers and lead some to view e-bay with suspicion. If price increases 
have been announced from the start, e-bay may lose less trust with 
customers. 
    
Risk allocation is an important part of many contracts, most clearly for 
insurance contracts the purpose of which is simply to trade risk. For such 
contracts, the rationale of specifying contingencies is straightforward: when 
one party wishes to carry some risk in one future contingency but not in 
another where the cost of carrying the risk may be lower for the other party, 
this result may be obtained through contingent contracting. Through a 
sufficiently contingent contract the parties may be able to share risk in a way 
that corresponds to the relative cost of risk to them in a particular 
contingency.  
This principle of optimal risk sharing through contingent contracting is rather 
straightforward for financial or insurance instruments, but applies also to other 
kinds of contracts, e.g. those involving the sale of goods. One example is that 
of a seller offering a warranty-contract to a buyer, putting the risk of a 
dysfunctional good on the seller for a specified period of time. To the extent 
that the seller carries risk more easily than the buyer (the opposite may well 
be true) the warranty induces a better risk allocation the broader it is in scope 
(the more contingencies it covers). But of course incentives come into the 
picture; a warranty increases the incentive for the seller of delivering a non-
defective good and decreases the incentive for the buyer to take care of the 
good, and hence from the perspective of incentives, it may be optimal to 
condition the seller’s obligations in some way, i.e. to distinguish future 
contingencies in the warranty contract.  Hence, it is clear that a greater 
degree of completeness may well enhance efficiency. Thus, it is evident that 
the (sometimes conflicting) purposes of risk allocation and incentives, provide 
an important rationale for writing elaborate contracts; distinguishing between 
future contingencies allows a more efficient combination of risk sharing and 
incentives.  
Applied to the example of e-bay, the issue of risk allocation is clearly pertinent 
to the choice between the contract permitting e-bay to increase prices when 
justified by increased costs and the contract stipulating some price index. It is 
a well-known problem with price indexes that the input costs of the supplier 
may not follow any general index. If some services become difficult for e-bay 
to deliver unless it hires highly skilled and hence expensive computer experts, 
it may have to increase prices for this reason; the contract with the price 
index hence puts the risk of this occurrence on e-bay rather than on its 
customers. From a pure risk allocation viewpoint it may be better to spread 
the risk among the many customers but this would lower the incentive for e-
bay to avoid such a situation. Thus, the trade-off between optimal risk-
allocation and optimal incentives mentioned above, arises also in the 
example of e-bay. 
 
Commitments by one party to a contract to do or not to do something in the 
future may affect the other party’s incentive to do something in the present. 
This is particularly clear in the case of a simple loan contract where (in the 
absence of altruism) person A will not lend to person B, if B cannot commit in 
some way to repay the loan. Among friends or relatives, a promise may be 
sufficient commitment, but among strangers a formal commitment that can be 
enforced by a third party (such as the State), i.e. a contract, is necessary for 
the establishment of a credible commitment. Clearly, if B cannot commit, as 
may be the case in the absence of contract enforcement, both A and B will be 
worse off, since a voluntary contract would have enhanced the expected 
welfare of both parties (as they see it), otherwise it would not be voluntary or 
they would not enter into it. This essential role of commitment applies 
whenever one party has to undertake acts before the other party does, and 
hence the ability to commit through contracts is essential for economic 
efficiency.  
Applied to the example of e-bay, recall that the essential problem was stated 
as the risk that e-bay may take advantage of a future increased bargaining 
power due to customers being to some degree locked into trading through e-
bay. The reason for e-bay to commit itself not to raise prices is that in the 
absence of such commitment its potential customers may be dissuaded from 
trading through e-bay in the first place. In other words, relationship specific 
investments (learning how to trade through e-bay) may not be undertaken in 
the absence of commitment from e-bay. Again, a trade-off arises: the third 
contract, which links prices to an index, provides the most commitment and 
hence may attract more customers, but puts perhaps too much risk on e-
bay8.  
 
Ad 4. Contracts establish commitments that allow people to plan their 
activities. This rationale is related to the protection of reliance investments, 
and will not be described further here. 
 
The main point can be restated as follows: whether or not to include a 
contingency or specific clause in a contract depends on three factors:  
-whether the contingency is sufficiently likely and important for it to be 
worthwhile to spend time on drafting a clause concerning it 
- whether something approaching the clause may come about as the result of 
renegotiation of the contract under the shadow of default rules and contract 
interpretation by the court (including the possibility of invalidation of unfair 
contract terms) as well as under the parties concern for reputation 
-how important any deviation from the optimal contract is in terms of the 
essential functions served by the contract, including securing efficient risk-
allocation, incentives, and reliance investments. 
 
                                                          
8 and may stifle innovation to the extent new services cannot be priced according to the demand for them.   
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
  
In the modern computerized economy, two factors seem of particular 
importance in determining the optimal level of completeness of contract9.   
First, uncertainty concerning the future is pervasive; in the example, e-bay 
cannot predict what its trading mechanisms will be three years from now, and 
any specific commitments concerning price will tend to be outdated when new 
hitherto unknown or even unimagined services come to exist. Second, 
reputation seems to have become a factor of growing importance through the 
sharing of information on the internet. Hence, as already noted, the way in 
which e-bay has in fact solved the commitment problem is through the 
reputation mechanism: On its home-page, e-bay writes that it  
`also encourages open and honest communication between the community 
and the company. Frequently, members of the community give their feedback 
to improve the environment in which they work and play´.  
 
To some extent, this may work as a reputation mechanism which restrains e-
bay from changing its prices unreasonably, and may well provide a better 
combination of commitment and flexibility than any specific price-clause.  
Note also that e-bay has organized a forum for sellers and buyers to give 
each other positive or negative feedback, made public by e-bay10.  For the 
buyers and sellers interacting through e-bay this possibility may lower the 
need for elaborate contracting, although it should be recalled that the cost of 
elaborate contracting is lowered through standard contracts. The main 
development may in fact be to render standard contracting terms more 
efficient: when reputation becomes a factor of greater importance, standard 
terms will become more generally known and will become part of the quality 
of the product sold. This provides an incentive for sellers of products to 
deliver contract terms that are reasonable and do not give rise to ´negative 
feedback´ on the internet.  
Hence, the main point of this article has not been to argue that reputation will 
overtake lengthy contracting in the information society. How contracting will 
                                                          
9 Contracts in civil law countries have increased considerably in length in recent years. It used to be said that contracts 
in civil law countries were shorter than in common law countries due to the less literate interpretation of contracts in 
civil law countries. However, this traditional wisdom no longer holds up, as contracts tend to become longer without 
any corresponding change in the way civil courts interpret contracts. On the general issue, see Hill and King: `How do 
German Contracts do as Much with Fewer Words?’  79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 889 (2004).     
10 This mechanism which may lower the need for lengthy contracts has, however, led to the problem of ´feed-back 
extortion’.   
 
evolve is a complex issue that requires closer study. Rather, the purpose of 
this article was to present some main determinants of the optimal length and 
specificity of contracts.  
